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COMMENT
The Growth of Cost-Shifting in Response to the Rising
Cost and Importance of Computerized Data in Litigation*
I. Introduction
The first years of the twenty-first century have seen the continued
emergence of computers as the medium of modern data creation and storage.
The dominance of electronic documents in America has necessitated a
definition of how discovery rules apply to these documents. As Dean
Gonsowski, the director of litigation strategy for a Denver e-discovery
services company, states, there is a “wild wild West” mentality with respect
to electronic discovery efforts.1 In other words, there is a feeling that
preservation of electronic documents is required, but courts have provided
little guidance.2
A. Typical Situation
Imagine that your client worked for a large corporation. After working for
this corporation for several years, the client began feeling threatened by
harassing e-mails routinely sent to the client’s computer at work. The e-mails
contained pornographic images and sexual language. These e-mails are
relevant, in fact, crucial, to your client’s cause of action. The alleged e-mails
were sent several years ago, however, and the corporation in question has
lawfully updated its computer systems, and maintains records of
correspondence on outdated “backup tapes.” To prove harassment, these
documents must be requested, as they are highly unlikely to be found
anywhere else. But the e-mails could be anywhere — or nowhere — on the
backup tapes. Not wanting to miss anything, you request that the corporation
produce all e-mails containing certain search terms over the course of your
client’s employment.
Now imagine that you represent the corporation. While maintaining that
no harassment took place, you want to make a good faith effort to produce any
documents that are requested by the opposing party. The corporation has
properly followed document retention procedures, and with a proper search,

* The author would like to thank Dace Caldwell and Professor Mary Sue Backus for their
abundant encouragement and constructive criticism during the writing of this comment.
1. See David L. Hudson, Jr., Two U.S. Courts Come Down Hard on E-Discovery
Violations, ABA J. EREPORT, Sept. 10, 2004.
2. Id.
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you can prove or disprove the existence of the pornographic material. Because
of the broad nature of the plaintiff’s document requests, however, the cost of
conducting this search and producing the documents is significant compared
to the damages requested by the plaintiff in the case. A multi-office,
exhaustive search of all documents that might be relevant would cost millions
of dollars. It would make good economic sense to try to settle the case,
despite your belief that the case has little merit, rather than producing the
documents in question.
Such was the case in Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc.3 In Wiginton, the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois had to evaluate the
nature of the discovery requests in light of the discovery rules in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules) and precedent in electronic
discovery cases.4 Specifically, the court examined the viability of “costshifting,” that is, shifting the cost of production of inaccessible electronic data
from the producing party to the requesting party.5 Its decision made an effort
to comport with case law and the Federal Rules, but shows how the lack of
guidance in cost-shifting cases can result in inconsistent judicial rule-crafting
and confusion among parties concerning the duty to preserve and produce
electronic data.
B. Electronic Discovery in General
Electronic documents have created challenges for all aspects of the
discovery process, from the initial disclosures required by Federal Rule
26(a)(1)6 to the sanctions that courts impose upon parties and attorneys who
obstruct another party’s access to discoverable materials.7 The phenomenon
has caused Congress to reevaluate and expand the definition of “document”
to include electronic data compilations.8 The question of who bears the cost
in electronic discovery disputes, however, has not specifically been addressed.
While the general presumption supplied by the Federal Rules is that the
producing party bears the expense and burden of production, the question

3. 229 F.R.D. 568 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
4. Id. at 572.
5. Id.
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1). These initial disclosures include individuals with discoverable
information, data that will be used to support claims, etc.
7. See David J. Waxse, “Do I Really Have to Do That?” Rule 26(a)(1) Disclosures and
Electronic Information, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 50, 50 (2004); see also Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note.
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remains as to how courts should apply the Federal Rules to the cost of
burdensome but necessary electronic discovery requests.9
Early precedent suggested that a party who chose to store documents in
electronic form should bear the risk and expense of having to produce that
data.10 More recent cases have suggested, however, that if requesting parties
expect to receive files that are difficult and costly for responding parties to
produce, they should be forced to bear some of the costs.11 These more recent
cases suggest balancing tests with multiple parts to determine the necessity of
cost-shifting.12 In 2003, the Congressional Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure proposed changes to the Federal Rules to address more clearly
electronic discovery issues.13 Although these proposed amendments confront
several problem areas of electronic discovery, the proposed changes fail to
specifically settle the issue of cost-shifting.14
Because the Federal Rules do not appear likely to give guidelines for costshifting in electronic discovery cases any time soon, it is important to
understand the federal guidelines as set forth in recent cases. A series of tests,
each modified by the subsequent case, have been developed at the district
court level.15 This comment examines these tests as applied by federal courts
in light of both the Federal Rules and the recent line of case law. By
considering both the current state of case law and proposed amendments to the
Federal Rules, this comment will give attorneys practicing in federal court a
9. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). The Rules do address discovery abuses in a general sense in
Rule 26(b)(2).
10. See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Legislation, Nos. 94 C 897,
MDL 997, 1995 WL 360526, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995).
11. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002);
McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001).
12. See, e.g., Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309.
13. ADVISORY COMM. ON FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, COMM. ON RULES OF
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE
CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE (Aug. 3, 2004) [hereinafter PROPOSED AMENDMENTS],
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2005/CVAug04.pdf.
14. The proposed amendments address five related areas:
(a) early attention to issues relating to electronic discovery, including the form of
production, preservation of electronically stored information, and problems of
reviewing electronically stored information for privilege; (b) discovery of
electronically stored information that is not reasonably accessible; (c) the assertion
of privilege after production; (d) the application of Rules 33 and 34 to
electronically stored information; and (e) a limit on sanctions under Rule 37 for
the loss of electronically stored information as a result of the routine operation of
computer systems.
Id. at 5-6.
15. See, e.g., Rowe, 205 F.R.D. 421; Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309; McPeek, 202 F.R.D. 31.
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comprehensive survey of the standard for shifting the cost of discovery as well
as tips for avoiding having to pay for the retrieval of offline electronic
documents, as either a producing or requesting party.
Part II gives a general overview of electronic data, including the unique
qualities of electronic data and the problems that those qualities cause, and
presents a fact pattern to illustrate the typical problems associated with
receiving electronic discovery requests. Part III places cost-shifting against
the backdrop of the Federal Rules, and discusses how case law has applied
these rules from the earliest electronic discovery cases to the commonly used
tests of Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc.16 and
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC.17 Part IV uses Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis,
Inc.18 as a model electronic discovery case and analyzes the application of
precedent and the Federal Rules to its facts. Part V examines the proposed
changes to the Federal Rules and weighs the benefits of updating Federal
Rules 26 and 34 to address cost-shifting against the current standard set forth
by Rowe, Zubulake, and Wiginton. Finally, Part VI discusses document
retention as a result of the cost-shifting analysis; specifically, this section
considers how a responding party can avoid having to pay for the cost of
deleted files while complying with document retention standards, and by
contrast, how a requesting party can retrieve helpful documents without
incurring the shifted costs.
II. The Complications of Electronic Discovery
A. What the Federal Rules Address
When Congress introduced the Federal Rules in 1937, there was no
contemplation of electronic information.19 As early as 1970, however,
Congress recognized that the increasing use of nonprint media posed a
problem with the discovery rules.20 The 1970 amendment to Rule 34 of the
Federal Rules suggested that the term “document” is inclusive enough to
encompass changing technology.21 The change, contained in the advisory
notes supporting Rule 34, clarified that the Rule allows for the discovery of
16. 205 F.R.D. 421.
17. 217 F.R.D. 309.
18. 229 F.R.D. 568 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
19. Waxse, supra note 7, at 50.
20. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Civil Litigation: Is Rule
34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 344 (2000).
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note. Rule 34 deals with the production of
documents for discovery purposes. As technology evolves, the scope of the definition of
“document” is crucial in determining the applicability of Rule 34 to electronic data.
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“electronics data compilations.”22 The new rule specifically provided for
“writings, drawings, graphs, charts . . . and other data compilations from
which information can be obtained.”23 Further, the amended Rule
contemplated that it may be necessary for the requesting party to use the other
party’s computer to disseminate the data, or even for the responding party to
make printouts of the requested data.24
Recent case law has suggested that when documents are produced in hard
copy form, the electronic form of that data is discoverable if it exists.25 In
fact, courts go so far to say, “[I]t is black letter law that computerized data is
discoverable if relevant.”26 This framework, coupled with the 1970
amendment to Rule 34, gives rise to increasing discovery costs, as it now
appears that a requesting party can request data in both electronic and paper
form.27 Despite the ease with which documents can be sorted and produced
in an electronic system, the sheer volume of electronically stored data can
increase costs. Civil litigation between two large corporate parties can
generate the equivalent of approximately one hundred million pages in
discovery documents.28 To produce these documents in paper form would
require each side to use over six thousand trees, and manual review would
require thirty person-years of review by each party.29
Because electronic discovery is conducted under traditional rules of
procedure, the reasonableness restrictions of these rules apply to electronic
media. Under Federal Rule 26(b)(2), courts may limit the extent of the use of
discovery methods, even if otherwise permitted, upon determining that one of
three situations exists.30 First, discovery may be limited when the request is
“unreasonably cumulative or duplicative,” or the requested information is
available from another source that is “more convenient, less burdensome, or

22. Id.
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a).
24. Id.
25. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94CIV.2120 (LMM) (AJP), 1995 WL 649934
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995).
26. Id. at *2.
27. This is subject to the usual reasonableness restrictions. “Rule 34 permits discovery of
electronically or digitally stored information provided, of course, that it meets the relevance test
articulated in the rules governing pretrial discovery and there is no other proper basis for
denying or restricting the discovery sought.” Cornell Research Found., Inc., v. Hewlett Packard
Co., 223 F.R.D. 55, 73 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
28. Robert Douglas Brownstone, Collaborative Navigation of the Stormy E-Discovery Seas,
10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 53, ¶ 21 (2004), http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v10i5/article53.pdf.
29. Id.
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
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less expensive.”31 Second, limitations can be invoked when the party seeking
discovery has already had “ample opportunity by discovery in the action to
obtain the information sought.”32 Third, the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery cannot “outweigh its likely benefit,” taking into account
factors such as the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, and the
importance of issues at stake in the litigation.33 Thus, a party who believes
that the expense of discovery or the burden of production “outweighs the
benefit of the discovery” should invoke a provision of Federal Rule 26(b)(2).34
Generally, courts have held that a responding party is presumed to be able
to bear the costs of discovery.35 Some scholars have pointed out that this
presumption is appropriate for paper documents because the responding party
has found that the utility of the document validates the cost of retention.36 The
document has utility, as evidenced by its retention, and retrieval should be a
duty of the responding party, “whether for its own needs or in response to a
discovery request.”37 The reasons for storing electronic data, however, may
be related to the low cost of storage. An electronic document may be kept
simply because there “is no compelling reason to discard it.”38 A closer look
at the problems associated with electronic documents reveals that responding
parties have many valid reasons to believe that the exceptions given in Rule
26(b)(2) apply to their electronic documents.
B. The Problem of Ghost-Data
Ninety-two percent of all new documents are now stored electronically.39
Moreover, one commentator estimates that 90 to 95% of all information is
stored electronically.40 Electronic data poses a unique set of problems for
producing parties because it has several qualities that are very different from
its paper counterpart.

31. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(I).
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(ii).
33. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(iii).
34. Stephen D. Willinger & Robin M. Wilson, Negotiating the Minefields of Electronic
Discovery, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 52, ¶ 9 (2004), http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v10i5/article52.
pdf.
35. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978).
36. Willinger & Wilson, supra note 34, at 56.
37. Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y.
2002); see also Willinger & Wilson, supra note 34, at 56.
38. Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 429.
39. Brownstone, supra note 28, ¶ 6.
40. William A. Fenwick, Electronic Records: Opportunity for Increased Efficiency, Mar.
1, 2006, http://www.lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/clientResources/practiceTips4.asp.
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Unlike a paper memorandum, which is read and discarded, an electronic
document is often left on a computer’s hard drive even if its existence serves
no further utility.41 Thus, large amounts of discoverable material may exist on
a computer's hard drive even though an equivalent paper document might have
been properly destroyed in a document retention scheme.
Even after a file is deleted, “ghost-data” may exist on a computer’s hard
drive.42 “Ghost-data” consists of blocks of memory that are marked for
overwriting but are not actually removed from the hard drive.43 In Zubulake
v. UBS Warburg LLC, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York discussed the troubling nature of these file fragments.44 The court noted,
“As files are erased, their clusters are made available again as free space.
Eventually, some newly created files become larger than the remaining
contiguous free space. These files are then broken up and randomly placed
throughout the disk.”45 Thus, parties may reasonably believe that files have
been deleted only to find these files have been discovered by an opponent in
litigation and have been used to obtain judgment against them. Often, ghostdata is corrupt, only good for identification purposes after significant
processing.46 Ghost-data can also be quite useful, however. For example,
Kenneth Starr’s team discovered the “talking points” document in Monica
Lewinsky’s computer, which was a document that Ms. Lewinsky had
deleted.47 The allure of finding a “smoking gun” e-mail or memo in a deleted
file makes requesting the production of deleted files contained on hard drives
or servers and backup tapes necessary.48 It is now well-established that
despite deletion being a signal that a document is intended for destruction, a
deleted computer file is discoverable.49
In addition to the problems posed by deleted files, an opposing party in
litigation will often request the production of backup tapes. These tapes are
routinely updated by companies in case of a catastrophic system failure that
41. Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 429 (“Information is retained not because it is expected to be used,
but because there is no compelling reason to discard it.”).
42. Kenneth J. Withers, Is Digital Different? Electronic Disclosure and Discovery in Civil
Litigation, Dec. 30, 1999, available at www.kenwithers.com/articles/bileta/index.htm.
43. Id.
44. (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 319 n.58 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
45. Id. at 319.
46. Id.
47. Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 20, at 329. If this deleted memo, which essentially
encouraged Monica Lewinsky to lie, was from Bill Clinton, he could then be found guilty of
obstruction of justice.
48. Id.
49. Deleted Computer Files — Retrieval — Court-Appointed Expert, FED. LITIGATOR (West
Group), Feb. 2003, at 44.
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would require complete reinstallation of files.50 In Zubulake I, Judge Shira
Scheindlin defined a backup tape as a “device, like a tape recorder, that reads
data from and writes it onto a tape.”51 These devices can store several
gigabytes of information.52 One scholar summarized the problem posed by
these backup tapes by stating:
Although the cost of back-up tapes themselves is relatively small,
the cost of restoring, reviewing, and extracting responsive
information from them can run into tens of thousands of dollars.
Typically, there is no directory; thus, only once back-up tapes are
“restored” and the contents indexed can the underlying information
be searched, extracted, and/or manipulated. Given that backed up
data must not only be indexed but also decompressed, the
restoration process is typically lengthy and costly.53
With high restoration costs but potentially relevant and probative
information, ghost-data will be the source of many electronic discovery
disputes. The remainder of this section discusses general properties of
electronic documents that make the documents more attractive than their paper
counterparts.
C. General Properties of Electronic Documents
While ghost-data and the routine duplication of electronic documents
causes headaches in searches, three properties make these documents more
valuable to a party in litigation than the paper version of the same document:
the existence of meta-data that reveals information about the document’s
authors, the naturally informal and duplicative nature of electronic personal
communication, and the ability to run topic and word searches on a large set
of documents in order to find relevant information. Despite these advantages,
each of these inherently make electronic data costly to produce.
1. Meta-data
Meta-data is “data about data.”54 When a paper document is requested
under Federal Rule 34, the only information that the requesting party receives
50. Brownstone, supra note 28, ¶ 10.
51. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 319.
52. Id.
53. Brownstone, supra note 28, ¶ 11 (footnotes omitted).
54. Madison River Mgmt. Co. v. Bus. Mgmt. Software Corp., 387 F. Supp. 2d 521, 528 n.5
(M.D.N.C. 2005); see also Christopher T. Furlow, Erogenous Zoning on the Cyber-Frontier,
5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7, ¶ 11 n.36 (2000), http://www.vjolt.net/vol5/issue2/v5i2a7-Furlow.html
#ff36.
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is information that can be inferred from the paper document. An electronic
document, however, contains background information, including the author’s
name, previous versions of the file, and the time at which the file was created
and updated.55 This information can be very valuable in litigation56 but can
also be expensive to produce.
2. Informality and Duplicity
E-mail and other forms of electronic communication, such as text
messaging and instant messaging, can be prepared and sent in less time than
traditional paper memorandum.57 Further, the very process of sending an email duplicates the document, as a copy remains on the computer of both the
sender and the recipient, if not the e-mail server itself. It is not surprising that
electronic communication may also prove less formal than its paper
counterpart. In one report, a lawsuit for sexual harassment settled after the
plaintiff discovered an e-mail from the defendant company’s president
ordering the head of personnel to “[g]et rid of that tight-assed bitch.”58
While the duplicity of e-mail may seem to make production of electronic
data less costly because of its existence in multiple places, this duplication
gives rise to the possibility that a copy exists in an unexpected location.59
Therefore, when a requesting party insists that an e-mail exists, that party may
insist on searching every available database for the e-mail in question.
Depending on the age of the deleted document, the machines that contain the
document as “ghost-data” may now be obsolete and either used for
rudimentary purposes or disposed of entirely. Searching multiple databases
is more costly, both in terms of labor required and system downtime because
of the search.
3. Ease of Search
Although searching for a file on a personal computer may seem simple,
when corporate servers that represent data from hundreds or thousands of

55. Waxse, supra note 7, at 14.
56. Withers, supra note 42. (“Metadata are important when viewing a word-processing
document, and considered essential when viewing an e-mail as the only method of
authenticating the sender, route, and content.”).
57. The entire business world is devouring technology which makes communication faster
and more efficient. For example, cellular phones have become combination phone, pager, email server, internet service provider, and planner.
58. Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 20, at 329; see also Heidi L. McNeil & Robert M.
Kort, Discovery of E-mail, OR. ST. B. BULL., Dec. 1995, at 21.
59. This information is durable, even if deleted, because of the problem of ghost-data. See
discussion infra Part II.B.
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computers are involved, searching for relevant files becomes more
complicated. Companies are hired to conduct discovery on network servers,
and use search software to look for “key terms” that may indicate a
document’s relevance to litigation.60 In one such investigation, the searching
company used eight “terms,” finding over 17,000 pertinent documents on one
of ninety-four tapes provided by the responding party.61 The court pointed out
that one e-mail sent to one person would register as two hits, once for the
recipient’s inbox and another for the sender’s outbox.62 After the searching
company “de-duplicated” the responding files, the number of relevant files
was cut in half.63
III. The Beginnings of a Cost-Shifting Test
A. Roots of Electronic Discovery Cost-Shifting Disputes
As early as 1977, U.S. courts made clear “[t]hat the 1970 amendments to
the Federal Rules rendered Rule 34 specifically applicable” to the production
of documents discoverable in computerized form.64 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that Rule 34 “appears to focus on putting
the data into a form intelligible to the discoverer so he can then study or
employ it.”65 In 1996, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York held in Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc.66 that a requesting plaintiff
would have to bear the costs of a producing defendant because of the burden
of producing electronic data.67 The plaintiff contended that the defendant
should be forced to produce the data processing records requested and, if the
records were difficult to sift through, write a program to extract the
information that the plaintiffs sought.68 The plaintiff further contended that
its relative economic position demanded that the court place the $5000 burden
for this discovery on the corporate defendant.69 The court held that these were

60. One such document retrieval system, run by Kroll’s Ontrack and “EDV” programs, was
used in Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 570 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
61. Id. at 570-71.
62. Id. at 571.
63. Id.
64. Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2d 636, 648 (2d Cir. 1976), rev’d, Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v.
Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978).
65. Id. at 642 n.7.
66. No. 94 Civ.2120 (LMM) (AJP), 1996 WL 22976 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 1996).
67. Id. at *2.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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ineffective arguments and that the burden of retrieving the precise data sought
by the plaintiff would be shifted from the defendant to the plaintiff.70
Within six months of the Hasbro decision, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois, in In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs
Antitrust Litigation,71 came to an opposite conclusion regarding the burden of
difficult retrieval processes.72 In this case, the defendant asked the court to
force the plaintiff to bear the cost of searching “e-mail data for names of
particular individuals and . . . eliminat[ing] duplicate messages.”73 The
estimated cost for this procedure was $50,000 to $70,000.74 In direct contrast
to Hasbro, the court determined that “if a party chooses an electronic storage
method, the necessity for a retrieval program or method is an ordinary and
foreseeable risk.”75 Today, a mere ten years after In re Brand Name, the
suggestion that electronic storage is a “choice” sounds strange in light of the
move to almost exclusively electronic storage. In fact, this decision has been
criticized as inapplicable to the electronic world in which we now live.76
Consequently, courts responded quickly to formulate balancing tests that
would adequately consider the cost and burden associated with producing
electronic data.
In McPeek v. Ashcroft,77 the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
attacked the In re Brand Name decision directly.78 The McPeek court
contended that there is an emerging judicial rationale that “producing backup
tapes is a cost of doing business in the computer age.”79 The court further
suggested that it is impossible to enter any office that is not using a
complicated electronic data storage system.80 To suggest that companies have
“a choice” in the storage system is simply unreasonable, the court reasoned,
like using “quill pens” to store data.81 Thus, the McPeek court, when faced
with a similar complicated and expensive data retrieval situation, examined
cost-shifting options. First, the court contemplated forcing the producing
70. Id.
71. Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1995 WL 360526 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995).
72. Id. at *3.
73. Id. at *1.
74. Id.
75. Id. at *2.
76. “[E]ven if this principle is unassailable in the context of paper records, it does not
translate well into the realm of electronic data.” Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency,
Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
77. 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001).
78. Id. at 33-34.
79. Id. at 33.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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party to bear the entire cost of restoring the data into a form that would be
searchable by the requesting party.82 The court reasoned that it is impossible
to know in advance the contents of backup tapes.83 The mere possibility that
the backup tapes would reveal something relevant to a claim or defense should
not force the producing party to bear all of the costs, considering the cost of
producing large amounts of irrelevant information.84 Second, the court
considered the “market” approach, which places the entire burden of the cost
of production onto the requesting party.85 The benefit of the market approach
is that the requesting party would only demand what it actually needs.86 This
approach, however, appears to fly in the face of the presumption that the
producing party pays for production because a requesting party would not
have been required to pay for a search of a paper depository.87
The McPeek court ultimately reached a compromise between the two
approaches by employing the “marginal utility” test, which later served as the
foundation for the multipart tests of Rowe, Zubulake, and Wiginton. The court
determined that “the more likely it is that the backup tape contains information
that is relevant to a claim or defense, the fairer it is that the [producing party]
search at its own expense.”88 The court also reasoned that economic
considerations are important to prevent excessive expense being borne by a
single party.89 Before rendering judgment, however, the court recognized that
this test was developed despite a “clash of policies and . . . lack of
precedential guidance.”90 Thus, the court ordered a “test run” in the form of
a partial test of the materials sought by discovery to determine the likelihood
that the electronic data would be relevant to the claims of the case.91
B. Detail Added to the Test: The Influence of Rowe’s Balancing Test
In 2002, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
began its role as the nation’s leader in the area of cost-shifting analysis.92 In
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 34.
86. Id.; see also Marnie H. Pulver, Note, Electronic Media Discovery: The Economic
Benefit of Pay-Per-View, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1379 (2000).
87. McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 34.
88. Id.
89. Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
90. McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 34.
91. Id.
92. The court is home to Judge Scheindlin, co-author of Electronic Discovery in Civil
Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, supra note 20, and the Zubulake decisions, as well as
Rowe, which was the first case to use a multipart test for cost-shifting. Anti-Monopoly, one of
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Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., the court developed
an eight-part test to determine where the burden of the cost of electronic
discovery should rest.93 This test was immediately accepted in courts across
the country until modified by Zubulake in 2003.94
Rowe involved plaintiff black concert promoters who claimed that they
were not permitted to promote events with white bands by the defendant
booking agencies and promoters.95 The plaintiffs made thirty-five “sweeping”
discovery demands, one of which included a request for “[a]ll documents
concerning market shares, market share values, market conditions, or
geographic boundaries in which any . . . concert promoter operates.”96 The
defendants responded with a motion for a protective order relieving them from
the burdensome discovery request.97 The court determined that the plaintiffs
had proven that the information requested was relevant, and that electronic
documents were discoverable as if they were paper documents.98 That
determination, however, did not end the inquiry.
The more difficult issue was the extent to which each party should pay the
costs of production. Under traditional discovery rules, “the presumption is that
the responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery
requests."99 Nevertheless, a court may protect the responding party from
“undue burden or expense” by shifting some or all of the costs of production
to the requesting party.100 In Rowe, “the expense of locating and extracting
responsive e-mails [was] substantial.”101 The court deemed it “appropriate to
the earliest cost-shifting e-discovery cases, was also decided in the Southern District of New
York.
93. Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
94. See Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 168, 173
(E.D. La. 2002) (“[Rowe] provides sound guidance for resolution of these issues . . . .”); see
also Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 553 (W.D. Tenn. 2003)
(adopting a balancing test that considers the Rowe factors to help determine whether an expense
is “undue”).
95. Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 423.
96. Id. at 424 (alterations in original).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 428; see also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1053 (S.D.
Cal. 1999).
99. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978).
100. McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001).
101. Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 428.
Here, the costs of the proposed discovery would be substantial by any definition.
Even the plaintiffs project that the costs for WMA would be between $24,000 and
$87,000, for Monterey between $10,000 and $15,000, for CAA between $60,000
and $70,000, and for SFX and QBQ approximately $64,000. The magnitude of
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determine which, if any, of these costs [were] ‘undue,’ thus justifying
allocation of those expenses to the plaintiffs.”102
The Rowe court flatly rejected the applicability of either In re Brand Name,
with its presumption that the producing party bears discovery costs, or the
“market” approach discussed in McPeek, which could cause poor litigants to
abandon meritorious legislation in the face of high discovery costs.103 Instead
of adopting either “bright-line rule,” the Rowe court created a balancing test
using the following eight factors:
(1) the specificity of the discovery requests; (2) the likelihood of
discovering critical information; (3) the availability of such
information from other sources; (4) the purposes for which the
responding party maintains the requested data (5) [sic] the relative
benefit to the parties of obtaining the information; (6) the total cost
associated with production; (7) the relative ability of each party to
control costs and its incentive to do so; and (8) the resources
available to each party.104
Although not universally embraced by other courts, these factors have been
influential.105 The rationale behind each factor is important in determining
why subsequent decisions adopted or rejected them.
1. The Specificity of the Requests
The Rowe court held that “[t]he less specific the requesting party’s
discovery demands, the more appropriate it is to shift the costs of production
to that party.”106 The court reasoned that a requesting party has the ability to
narrow a discovery request, and counting a lack of specificity against the
requesting party gives the requesting party an incentive to avoid broad

these expenses favors cost-shifting.
Id. at 431.
102. Id. at 429.
103. Id.
104. Id. The court maintained that “courts have adopted a balancing approach” but did not
cite any authority for the factors listed. Id. “Each of these factors is relevant in determining
whether discovery costs should be shifted in this case.” Id.
105. Zubulake used some of the Rowe factors in creating its test. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg
LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Wiginton turned to both Zubulake
and Rowe in its analysis. Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 572-73 (N.D. Ill.
2004).
106. Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 429 (citing In re Gen. Instrument Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 96 C 1129,
1999 WL 1072507, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 1999)).
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requests.107 The court noted that the plaintiff’s “nebulous” requests favored
cost-shifting.108
2. The Likelihood of Discovering Relevant Information
Relying on McPeek, the Rowe court reasoned that the less likely it is for
produced documents to be relevant to the matter at hand, the more unfair it is
to force the producing party to pay the cost of production.109 The court held
that though the plaintiff showed that there was enough likelihood that relevant
material was requested to preclude a protective order, the absence of proof
that the material would be “a gold mine” made the court consider its value
“marginal at best.”110
3. The Availability of the Information from Other Sources
If the information sought can be obtained by the requesting party in a less
burdensome manner, courts have traditionally found that the requesting party
should pay the costs of obtaining the information in the form requested.111
This factor is required, as the party requesting the production would
necessarily be harassing the responding party if its own burden in producing
the document would be lighter than that of the responding party.112 In most
electronic discovery cases, as in Rowe, the information sought will only be
available on the producing party’s servers or backup tapes.113 It is difficult to
imagine a scenario where the requesting party would have a lesser burden in
producing an electronic document stored primarily on an opposing party’s
server.114 Therefore, this factor will usually cut against cost-shifting.115
107. Id. at 430.
108. Id. The court contrasts the plaintiff’s requests with the requests in McPeek v. Ashcroft,
202 F.R.D. 31, 33 (D.D.C. 2001), where the court used its discretion to narrow the requesting
party’s search.
109. Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 430 (using McPeek’s “marginal utility” analysis); see also McPeek,
202 F.R.D. at 34.
110. Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 430.
111. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94 Civ.2120 (LMM) (AJP), 1996 WL
22976, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 1996) (holding “[i]f plaintiff wants the computerized
information, it will have to pay defendants’ reasonable costs of creating computer programs to
extract the requested data from defendants’ computers”).
112. To request documents from an opposing party that the requesting party could produce
more cheaply would be contrary to economic policy. Further, as discovery exists for the
purpose of allowing one party to be aware of all the facts relevant to a cause of action or defense
thereto, when the requesting party’s access is less burdensome, federal discovery rules are
violated, almost by definition. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
113. Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 430.
114. One possible such scenario would involve a document that is stored in difficult to
produce, archived form by both parties. Because such offline documents are costly to produce,
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4. The Purposes for Which the Responding Party Retains the Data
The Rowe court asserted, “A party that expects to be able to access
information for business purposes will be obligated to produce that same
information in discovery.”116 On the other hand, if the requested data is kept
for backup or emergency system recovery purposes, the requesting party
should not have to pay for production.117 The backup tapes in question in
Rowe were considered emergency backups and therefore this factor favored
cost-shifting.118
5. Benefit to the Parties
The court reasoned that if a responding party benefits from its production
of data, there is less reason to shift the cost to the requesting party.119
Obviously, because a party is requesting the document for use in litigation, the
party believes the document will be of benefit. Nevertheless, in the rare case
when producing documents will benefit the producing party, this will cut
against cost-shifting.120 For example, if the producing party is required by law
to have the offline documents121 in readily producible form, or would receive
some pecuniary benefit because of the production, this factor may apply.
6. Total Cost Associated with Production
Of course, if the cost of production is very low, there is no compelling
reason to shift costs.122 In Rowe, the court noted that there is no set threshold
for what is considered a “substantial” cost.123

a requesting party may wish to transfer that cost to its opponent through discovery requests.
115. Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 430; see also Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216
F.R.D. 280, 286-87 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
116. Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 431.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. The Zubulake court acknowledged the validity of this factor, but noted that it is the
least important because of the rarity of its application. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC
(Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
121. “Offline” data includes magnetic tapes, back-up archives, deleted data, and any other
electronic data that is not “active,” such as data currently listed in hard drive files, or “nearly
active,” such as automated archive retrieval systems. Id. at 318-20. See infra notes 137-41 and
accompanying text.
122. Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 431.
123. Id.; see Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94 Civ.2120 (LMM) (AJP), 1996 WL
22976, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 1996) Courts have determined that discovery costs as low as
$1680 were “not ‘insubstantial.’” Id.
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7. The Ability of the Parties to Control Costs
The Rowe court held that “it is more efficient to place the burden on the
party that will decide how expansive the discovery will be.”124 Such reasoning
is an influence of the “market approach” rejected in McPeek.125 The theory
behind this factor is that if the producing party has a high incentive to control
costs but the requesting party does not, the requesting party may be the more
appropriate party upon whom to allocate the cost of discovery.126 If the party
that does not have an incentive to control costs is requesting discovery, it may
have incentive to burden the producing party with requests.
8. The Resources of Each Party
The final Rowe factor recognizes that “the cost, even if modest in absolute
terms, might outstrip the resources of one of the parties, justifying an
allocation of those expenses to the other.”127 This ensures fairness when a
party of limited resources makes a burdensome, yet necessary, electronic
discovery request.
Rowe expanded McPeek to create the first systematic test for cost-shifting
in electronic discovery disputes. The Rowe court determined that the factors
tended to favor the producing party; thus, the requesting party was required
to bear the majority of the production costs.128 While the Rowe test provided
courts with a step-by-step analysis of electronic discovery disputes, the test
faced immediate revision one year later in the Zubulake line of cases.
C. Zubulake Puts the Factors in Their Place
The Southern District of New York used the Rowe balancing test as the
foundation for a new cost-shifting analysis. In Zubulake v. UBS Warburg
LLC,129 a former employee of a large corporation sought the production of
deleted e-mails to show gender discrimination by her former superiors. The
Zubulake court criticized the Rowe test in its application, however, because
all opinions following Rowe had determined that cost-shifting was
appropriate.130 The court noted that “[i]n order to maintain the presumption
that the responding party pays, the cost-shifting analysis must be neutral; close
calls should be resolved in favor of the presumption.”131 The court feared that,
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 432.
McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001).
Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 431-32.
Id. at 432.
Id. at 433.
(Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Id. at 320.
Id.
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because of the fact that electronic documents are discoverable in almost all
modern litigation, a broad cost-shifting rule would undermine well-established
rules of discovery.132 With large corporations moving to an almost paper-free
storage environment, a test that tends to favor the shifting of costs in all
electronic discovery situations may tend to discourage meritorious suits by
private parties against corporations.133
To retain the presumption that a responding party should bear the cost of
production, while simultaneously providing for cost-shifting in the case of
inaccessible, offline data, the Zubulake court split the test for cost-shifting into
three steps. First, the electronic data is categorized based upon the difficulty
of retrieval. If the data is offline, cost-shifting may be appropriate; if not, the
Rowe analysis is completely inapplicable.134 Second, the court required the
use of a “test-run” to determine the relevancy of the data requested. While the
likelihood of finding relevant information is certainly important, the Zubulake
court noted that without a factual analysis, there is no way to actually
determine the likelihood of the existence of this information.135 Finally, the
court applied a modified Rowe test in order to allocate the cost of discovery.136
The Zubulake court completely changed the circumstances under which a
Rowe-like factor test would be applied. The court placed electronic data into
five different categories, from the most to least accessible: (1) active, online
data;137 (2) “near-line” data;138 (3) “[o]ffline storage/archives”;139 (4) backup
132. Id. at 317.
133. Id. at 317-18.
134. Id. at 318. “In fact, whether production of documents is unduly burdensome or
expensive turns primarily on whether it is kept in an accessible or inaccessible format (a
distinction that corresponds closely to the expense of production).” Id.
135. Id. at 323.
136. Id. at 322. The Zubulake court restates the factors which determine whether costshifting is proper as follows:
XXx1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant
information;
XXx2. The availability of such information from other sources;
XXx3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in controversy;
XXx4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available to each
party;
XXx5. The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so;
XXx6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and
XXx7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.
Id.
137. Id. at 318. This is where data is kept during its “active” life, where the access frequency
and speed are both high. Id.
138. This class of storage includes what the court refers to as “optical disks.” In layman’s
terms, these are CD-ROM and floppy disks, as well as similar storage media. Id. at 318-19.
139. These are optical disks, similar to CD-ROM devices, that are stored for storage
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tapes;140 and (5) erased, fragmented, or damaged data.141 Only the last two of
these categories were considered “inaccessible” by the Zubulake court.142 In
Zubulake, the responding party stored e-mails in three different places: active
user e-mail files, archived e-mails on optical disks, and backup data stored on
tapes.143 Of the three, a cost-shifting test would only be performed on the
third because for “accessible” forms of media, “it would be wholly
inappropriate to even consider cost-shifting.”144 The court reasoned that if
data is maintained in an “accessible and usable” format, the traditional
presumption that the producing party pays for discovery applies.145 Thus,
under Zubulake, the first analysis is to consider whether cost-shifting is
appropriate at all by considering the accessibility of the requested electronic
discovery.
The next step is to determine whether cost-shifting is necessary. Zubulake
suggested that courts applying Rowe largely favored cost-shifting because of
assumptions made concerning the relevance of the documents that were to be
discovered.146 In Rowe, the court criticized the requesting party for not
showing that the requested e-mail would, in fact, yield discoverable
information related to a potential claim or defense.147 Zubulake pointed out,
however, that “such proof will rarely exist in advance of obtaining the
requested discovery.”148
The Zubulake court then held that utilizing a “test-run,” as used in McPeek,
would be beneficial in determining the relevancy of the requested discovery.149
The court ordered the responding party to produce a small sample of the
requested material to inform the cost-shifting procedure.150 The court
reasoned that when the actual relevancy of a sample of discovered material is
purposes only, and which may require substantial processing. Id. at 319.
140. Id. Backup tapes are very difficult to retrieve data from because “[t]he data on a backup
tape are not organized for retrieval of individual documents or files [because] . . . the
organization of the data mirrors the computer’s structure, not the human records management
structure.” Id. (footnote omitted).
141. Id. This data is “ghost data” which has been deleted from a computer or server and may
only exist in parts on the disk. “Such broken-up files are said to be ‘fragmented,’ and along
with damaged and erased data can only be accessed after significant processing.” Id.
142. Id. at 319-20.
143. Id. at 320.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 323.
147. Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 430 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
148. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 323.
149. Id.; see McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34-35 (D.D.C. 2001).
150. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324.
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examined, the analysis of the material’s relevance is not “an exercise in
speculation,” but is instead “grounded in fact.”151 Thus, after the results of a
test are available, the parties may then argue more effectively whether cost
shifting is appropriate based on the relevance of the material to the matter and
the cost of production, as both cost and relevance will be more lucent.152
The Zubulake court found factors one and two of Rowe’s test to be
duplicative.153 Both Rowe factors, the specificity of the discovery requests and
the likelihood of discovering critical information, address the effectiveness of
the form of the requests.154 To replace these factors, the court created a single
factor that encompasses the original two, namely “the extent to which the
request is specifically tailored to discover relevant information.”155 The
Zubulake court also added a factor to the Rowe analysis that will admittedly
be rarely applied.156 The court noted that “if a case has the potential for broad
public impact, then public policy weighs heavily in favor of permitting
extensive discovery.”157
The Zubulake court rejected the fourth Rowe factor, which considers the
purposes for which the responding party retains the data, as unimportant.158
The court held that “[w]hether the data is kept for a business purpose or for
disaster recovery does not affect its accessibility, which is the practical basis
for calculating the cost of production.”159 The Zubulake modification looked
to accessibility as a reason for justifying cost-shifting, finding the purpose of
151. Id. The court does point out that even this small factual showing may be too much of
a burden to place upon the responding party when the cost of this production is high compared
to the amount at controversy in the suit, or when the suit itself is frivolous. Id. at 324 n.77.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 321.
154. Id.
155. Id. To be fair, while Rowe’s first two factors were similar in purpose (encouraging
effective and fair discovery requests), the first two Rowe factors were not as duplicative as Judge
Scheindlin suggests. Each had separate goals (specificity vs. relevance). There truly is a
difference between being “specifically tailored to discover relevant information” and having a
high likelihood of discovering relevant information. While factor five of the Rowe test (the
relative benefit of obtaining the information) makes the second Rowe factor a bit duplicative,
it would be more accurate to say that Zubulake I dropped the second Rowe factor and modified
the first, instead of combining the two.
156. Id. at 321.
157. For example, the court mentions examples from toxic tort class actions to constitutional
questions which might have the broad appeal to justify extensive discovery. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. Judge Scheindlin further rejected the fourth factor because “[i]t is certainly true that
data kept solely for disaster recovery is often relatively inaccessible because it is stored on
backup tapes. But it is important not to conflate the purpose of retention with accessibility.”
Id. at 322 n.68.
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the retention wholly unimportant.160 After all, the court reasoned, “[a] good
deal of accessible, easily produced material may be kept for no apparent
business purpose. Such evidence is no less discoverable than paper
documents that serve no current purpose and exist only because a party failed
to discard them.”161
The Zubulake court modified the sixth factor to relate the total cost of the
production to the amount in controversy.162 If the amount in controversy is
low compared to the cost of producing information, a settlement would be
preferable to producing the documents. In Zubulake, the cost of producing the
documents was estimated at over $180,000, while the amount in controversy,
at lowest estimate, was almost $2 million.163 This disparity was high enough
to suggest that requiring the producing party to pay the costs might be
appropriate.164 The Zubulake court tweaked the seventh factor in the same
manner as the sixth by relating the total cost of production to the resources of
the party.165 The higher the cost of production, the more likely that disparity
between the resources of the parties would favor one party or another in the
cost-shifting analysis.
Finally, Zubulake suggested that the multifactor test should be applied, but
in a particular manner not employed by other courts using Rowe.166 The
Zubulake court first contended that the factors given should be used as a
guide, not a checklist; therefore, each factor should not be weighted equally.167
The first two factors in the new Zubulake test, which are most reflective of the
fairness of cost-shifting, are given the most weight.168 The next most important
group of factors are those relating to cost and financial resources.169 Finally,
the court considered the rare situation in which the issues at stake in the
litigation are of significant public importance, finishing its inquiry by

160. If the data is readily accessible, there is generally no need for cost-shifting. Id. at 31720.
161. Id. at 322 n.68.
162. Id. at 321.
163. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 287-88 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
164. Id. at 288.
165. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 321.
166. Id. at 322.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 324 (“1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover
relevant information; 2. The availability of such information from other sources”). If the request
is overbroad or the materials are available from a more accessible source, the presumption that
the responding party bears the cost of discovery can be more easily cast aside.
169. Id.
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considering the even rarer situation in which the producing party benefits from
producing the information.170
The cost-shifting determination is not to be made in favor of the party that
the majority of the factors favor, but rather the court is to evaluate costshifting in light of its purpose.171 The purpose of cost-shifting is to avoid an
“undue burden or expense” on the producing party; thus, the central issue that
should be examined in a cost-shifting analysis is the importance of “the
sought-after evidence in comparison to the cost of production.”172
In its analysis of the Rowe factors, Zubulake noted the degree to which a
factor favored or disfavored cost-shifting.173 In contrast, Rowe never
examined the degree to which each of its factors favored cost-shifting, only
whether each did or did not favor cost-shifting.174 The Zubulake court
determined that some fractional amount of the cost should be shifted.
The application of the new Zubulake test suggested that under these
circumstances, the producing party should bear most of the cost of
production.175 Shifting the cost too much would chill the rights of litigants to
pursue meritorious claims. However, because the success of the search was
somewhat speculative, any cost that could be fairly assigned to the requesting
party was appropriate and ensured that the producing party’s expenses would
not be unduly burdensome. According to the court, 25% assignment to the
requesting party met these goals in this case.176
IV. Still Wiggling: The Application of Zubulake in Wiginton v. CB Richard
Ellis, Inc.
After Zubulake, some began to believe that the shortcomings of the Federal
Rules in failing to address cost-shifting in electronic discovery were “greatly
exaggerated.”177 On the other hand, a White Paper prepared by Lawyers for
170. Id. If either of these “rare” factors apply, it will favor maintaining the presumption that
the producing party bears the cost of discovery.
171. Id. at 322-23.
172. Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(iii).
173. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
174. Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 430-32 (S.D.N.Y.
2002). The court categorizes each factor based on whether it favors cost shifting, does not favor
cost shifting, or is neutral. The court then completes its analysis by stating that “[t]he relevant
factors thus tip heavily in favor of shifting to the plaintiffs the costs of obtaining discovery of
e-mails in this case.” Id. at 432.
175. Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 289.
176. Id.
177. Bahar Shariati, Zubulake v. UBS Warburg: Evidence That the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Provide the Means for Determining Cost Allocation in Electronic Discovery
Disputes?, 49 VILL. L. REV. 393, 393 (2004).
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Civil Justice directly called for specific amendments to the Federal Rules to
address cost-shifting.178 The report praised the Zubulake decision for being
“sophisticated” and “discretionary,” absent the “reference in the rules that
directs the court” in the cost-shifting analysis.179 The paper conceded that
“[s]uch thorough and painstaking analysis may be necessary and appropriate
in certain cases,” but maintained that it “is no substitute for a clear, direct and
straightforward procedural rule on the subject.”180
Because of the common occurrence of electronic discovery and costshifting disputes, the wait for an interpretation of Zubulake was not a long
one. In many ways, Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc. provided the perfect
test for Zubulake’s new cost-shifting analysis. First, Wiginton was decided in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, far from the direct
influence of the Southern District of New York.181 Second, the facts were
very familiar. The plaintiff contended that the defendant had engaged in a
widespread practice of sexual harassment; thus, the plaintiff needed to access
deleted e-mails and other files to find pornographic materials that were
allegedly being distributed electronically.182 Third, the cost to produce the
materials requested from inaccessible backup tapes was substantial, causing
the defendant to have reason to fight the discovery requests.183 The court
discussed the history of cost-shifting decisions before modifying Zubulake and
Rowe in its own analysis.184
The Wiginton court only addressed the factors of Zubulake, ignoring its
three-step analysis of whether cost-shifting is possible in the first place.185
This may not, however, signal a complete rejection of the Zubulake
framework. Wiginton addressed the first step, determining whether the data
is inaccessible, in a footnote that mentioned the similarity of these backup
tapes to those in Zubulake.186 The Court further rendered unnecessary
Zubulake’s second step because a “test-run” of the discovery material had
already been performed by the producing party.187 The court’s analysis was
178. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, LCJ WHITE P APER: RESHAPING THE DISCOVERY RULES
6-8 (2003) [hereinafter LCJ WHITE PAPER].
179. Id. at 9.
180. Id.
181. The Zubulake decisions were made by influential Judge Shira Scheindlin of New
York’s Southern District. The Rowe and Hasbro cases were also decided in this district. See
supra note 92 and accompanying text.
182. Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 569-70 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
183. Id. at 575.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 571-73.
186. Id. at 572 n.6.
187. Id. at 569-71. A “review set” was examined by Kroll, Inc., a company specializing in
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
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limited to the Rowe and Zubulake factors for determining the degree of costshifting.188 Therefore, although the court did not apply the full Zubulake test,
neither did it reject the preliminary three-step analysis. If the court intended
to adopt the Zubulake test and not simply use it as a guide, it is surprising that
the court chose to apply Zubulake without explicitly addressing this most
significant feature of the Zubulake opinion.
Wiginton applied the specificity factor in much the same way as the courts
in Zubulake and Rowe.189 Before determining whether the likelihood of
finding relevant information favored or disfavored cost-shifting, however, the
court examined the second factor, the availability of this information from
other sources.190 The court found the typical result — that e-mails sent
internally and deleted on machines were only available on backup tapes that
were difficult to examine.191 Instead of weighing factors one and two
individually, the court looked at the totality of the two, labeling them as the
“Marginal Utility Test.”192 The court compared the test run responsive rate in
Zubulake to that conducted by an independent data recovery company, Kroll,
Inc., in the case at hand.193 The responsive rate in Zubulake was over ten
times higher.194 Because “the search also revealed a significant number of
unresponsive documents,” the court determined that “the marginal utility test
weighs slightly in favor of cost-shifting.”195
Wiginton’s cost factors were used in the manner introduced by Zubulake,
considering the ratio of discovery costs to the potential recovery and the
resources of the parties, and examining the incentive of the parties to control
costs.196 Wiginton adopted but dismissed the new factor introduced by
Zubulake, the public significance of the issues at stake in the litigation, as both

production of electronic documents from inaccessible sources. Id.
188. Id. at 575.
189. Id. at 574. This very fact-specific analysis was made easier by the fact that a “test-run”
had previously been ordered. The court determined that 4.5% of the e-mails were “responsive,”
meeting search criteria, meaning that they “may” be relevant to the matter.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. This was a clear nod to the test introduced in McPeek, from which these two factors
were taken in Rowe. See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421,
429-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
193. Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 574.
194. Id. The responsive rate in Zubulake was 55.8%, while in Wiginton, only 4.5%. Id.
195. Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 575.
196. Id. at 575-76. The third factor (amount in controversy compared to cost of production)
cut in favor of cost-shifting, the fourth (amount in controversy compared to resources) cut
against it, and the fifth (ability to control costs) weighs slightly in favor of cost-shifting.
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parties agreed that the factor was neutral.197 The court also judged the final
factor, the benefit to the parties of production, to be neutral.198
Wiginton added its own eighth factor to the cost-shifting analysis, using the
Federal Rules to justify its decision.199 The court maintained that “the
importance of the requested discovery in resolving the issues at stake in the
litigation” must be added.200 At first glance, this factor seems to duplicate the
first factor, which considers the relevance of the information to be discovered.
The court pointed out, however, that the requested discovery may be relevant,
but not necessarily needed.201 The court noted that “[a]s there is reason to
believe that the requested discovery would assist in resolving the issues at
stake in this case, but because there is also other evidence to support
Plaintiffs’ claims, we find that this factor weighs slightly in favor of costshifting.”202 If the court had merely suggested that the requested discovery
would only marginally assist in resolving the issues, this new factor would
seem to favor cost-shifting. But instead, the court held that the requested
discovery assisted in resolving the litigation while citing “other evidence to
support” as reason to shift the burden.203
In its holding, the court simply listed the degree to which each of the factors
that weighed for or against cost-shifting.204 The court determined that the
requesting party was responsible for 75% of the costs, while the responding
197. Id. at 576. The importance of the litigation will only change the cost shifting analysis
in rare instances. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 289
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[D]iscrimination in the workplace . . . is hardly unique.”).
198. Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 577.
199. Id. at 576-77 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(iii)) (stating that “the burden or expense
of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case,
the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues”) (emphasis
added).
200. Id. at 576.
201. Id. at 576-77.
202. Id. at 577.
203. Id. (citing Channelmark Corp. v. Destination Prods. Int’l, Inc., No. 99 C 214, 2000 WL
968818, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 7, 2000), for the proposition that if relevancy is in doubt, courts
should err on the side of permissive discovery).
204. The court ultimately held:
Factors 1 and 2, the most important factors, weigh slightly in favor of cost-shifting
to Plaintiffs. For the cost factors: factor 3 weighs in favor of cost-shifting; factor
4 weighs against cost-shifting; and factor 5 weighs slightly in favor of costshifting. Factor 6 is neutral; factor 7 weighs slightly in favor of cost-shifting; and
factor 8 is neutral.
Id. It is difficult to list the results of the analysis without sounding like the factors are being
used as a “checklist,” which Zubulake warned against, instead of a mere “guide.” Zubulake v.
UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 322-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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party was responsible for the remaining 25%.205 The analysis as a whole
“favor[ed] cost shifting,” but the court looked to the presumption that the
producing party bears the cost of discovery in allocating a quarter of the cost
to the defendant.206

Table: Comparison of the Cost-shifting Tests

Rowe

Zubulake

Wiginton

Date of Opinion

January 2002

May 2003

August 2004

ROWE FACTORS

Rowe

Zubulake

Wiginton

Specificity of
Discovery
Requests

“Factor One,”
considered very
relevant.207

Combined with “Factor
Two,” considered one
of two “most
important” factors.208

Followed Zubulake.209

Likelihood of a
Successful
Search

“Factor Two,” also very
relevant as part of
“Marginal Utility
Test.”210

See above.

See above.

Availability of
Information from
Other Sources

“Factor Three” will
normally favor
requesting party.211

Accepted. Considered
one of two “most
important” factors.212

Followed Zubulake.213

205. Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 577.
206. Id. It appears that this conclusion could be reached by simply assigning values to each
of the factors. Assume, for the sake of argument, that each factor which “slightly favors” one
side or another is worth one point, and each factor which “favors” it is worth two. Also assume
that the factors which the court considers “most important” (factors one and two) are worth
double points. Using this analysis, six points are allocated for cost shifting to two against.
Thus, using this formula, one arrives at the same conclusion as the court.
207. Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421, 429-30 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
208. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 321.
209. Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 572.
210. Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 430.
211. Id.
212. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 322-23.
213. Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 574.
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Rowe

Zubulake

Wiginton

Date of Opinion

January 2002

May 2003

August 2004

ROWE FACTORS

Rowe

Zubulake

Wiginton

Purposes for
Which the
Producing Party
Keeps the
Information

“Factor Four,”
documents kept for
legitimate business
purposes less likely to
require cost-shifting.214

Factor rejected because
the purpose does not
affect the accessibility
of the document.215

Not mentioned.

Relative Benefit
to the Parties of
Obtaining the
Information

“Factor Five,” when
responding party
benefits from
production, costshifting is less likely.216

Followed Rowe.
Considered relatively
unimportant.217

Followed Zubulake.218

Total Cost
Associated with
Production

“Factor Six,” no cause
to cost-shift if cost is
not substantial.219

Modified to consider
the relative cost
compared with the
amount in
controversy.220

Followed Zubulake.221

Incentive and
Ability of Parties
to Control Costs

“Factor Seven,” places
the burden on the party
with the incentive to
control costs.222

Followed Rowe.223

Followed Rowe and
Zubulake.224

Resources
Available to
Each Party

“Factor Eight,” if costs
would strip the
resources of a party,
courts can allocate
accordingly.225

Modified to consider
the cost of discovery
compared with the
resources available.226

Followed Zubulake.227

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 431.
Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 321-22.
Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 431.
Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 323.
Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 577.
Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 431.
Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 321, 323.
Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 573, 575.
Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 431-32.
Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 322-23.
Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 576.
Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 432.
Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 321.
Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 575-76.
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ZUBULAKE
MODIFICATIONS

Rowe

Zubulake

Wiginton

Three-Step
Process: 1)
accessibility of
data, 2) test-run,
and 3)
application of
factors

Not done, called for
only the application of
the factors.

Proscribed.228

May have been
followed; not
explicitly stated.229

New Factor:
Importance of
issues at stake in
litigation

Not mentioned.

Admittedly will be
rarely applied. Not
applied in Zubulake.230

Followed Zubulake.231

WIGINTON
MODIFICATION

Rowe

Zubulake

Wiginton

New Factor:
Importance of
discovery in
resolving the
issues at stake in
litigation.

Not mentioned.

Not mentioned.

Added to the factors
of Rowe and Zubulake
because it is explicitly
mentioned in the
Federal Rules.232

V. Amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
In its preface to Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules, the
Congressional Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure noted the
emerging case law concerning general electronic discovery,233 and raised
several specific concerns. First, as discussed earlier,234 the case law is not
consistent.235 Further, the committee noted that because discovery disputes
are rarely granted appellate review, there is no way to develop binding
228. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324.
229. A test-run did take place, ordered by the court, and its results are discussed. Wiginton,
229 F.R.D. at 570-71. However, the court did not state whether this analysis was done as a
result of Zubulake’s requirement to provide a factual basis for the application of the factors.
Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 323-24.
230. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 321.
231. Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 576.
232. Id. at 576-77.
233. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 13, at 3. The committee did not specify the case
law, and due to the committee’s failure to directly address cost-shifting, it is unlikely that Rowe
and Zubulake are the objects of this commentary. However, the problems that plague discovery
case law in general is shared by cost-shifting specifically, as cost-shifting is merely a subset of
the larger realm of e-discovery.
234. See discussion infra Parts III, V.
235. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 13, at 3.
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authority.236 Despite the “well drafted” flexibility of the Federal Rules,
changes in technology are quickly requiring courts to adapt rules to address
electronic discovery. Because different jurisdictions are applying varying
standards, and because of the inadequacy of the Federal Rules in their current
state, the committee advocated addressing electronic discovery by amending
Federal Rules 26 and 34.237 The committee recognized that delay in providing
adequate federal assistance for dealing with electronic discovery would likely
“result in a proliferation of local rules” and “frustrate the ability to achieve the
national standard the Civil Rules were intended to provide in the areas they
address.”238
The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules addressed several areas
with implications for cost-shifting.239 The Proposed Amendments considered
early problems of electronic discovery, including the form of production,
preservation of electronically stored information, and problems related to
reviewing possibly privileged information.240 In order to address these
problems, the committee first addressed the “quick peek” approach to
determining the relevancy of requested material. Second, the committee
proposed a clarification of Federal Rule 26(b)(2), which defines what types
of information are “not readily accessible.”241 Because this definition
specifically triggers the Zubulake analysis, these proposed changes may also
affect and clarify cost-shifting analysis. The third area the committee
addressed was the applicability of Rule 34 to electronic information.242 The
following subparts address these three concerns individually.
A. The Quick Peek Approach to Discovery
McPeek introduced a “quick peek” method of examining electronically
discovered documents to determine relevance.243 Before a database is fully
searched, a “test run” will be ordered in advance of a decision regarding cost-

236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 4.
239. Two topics are, at best, tenuously related to cost-shifting and will not be discussed in
this comment. These two areas deal with the assertion of privilege after production and a limit
on Rule 37 discovery sanctions stemming from the loss of discoverable information because of
the routine operation of computer systems. See id. at 5-6.
240. Id. at 5.
241. Id. at 10-12.
242. Id. at 5-6.
243. McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34-35 (D.D.C. 2001).
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shifting.244 This logic was followed in Zubulake for the purpose of economic
efficiency.245
Of course, “quick peek” analysis increases the risk of waiver of privilege,
as producing parties may not be able to predict which documents will be
flagged by a preliminary search. Parties now attempt to agree to protocols that
reduce the risk of waiver, and the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
explicitly allows for a “claw back” arrangement, which would allow
documents to be produced electronically without a prior privilege
agreement.246 If a produced document was found by the producing party to
include privileged information, the producing party would not have waived the
privilege and could retract that particular document.247 These agreements
allow parties to reduce the very high cost of privilege review in electronic
discovery.248
Though the amendment would not address cost-shifting directly, its result
tends to compliment the Zubulake and Wiginton tests. The “quick peek”
would become even cheaper for a producing party that believes a requesting
party’s discovery demands are irrelevant. A requesting party could use the
agreement to pacify a producing party that fiercely guards their computer
database for fear of waiving privilege.
A Lawyers for Civil Justice report has criticized the “quick peek” approach,
suggesting that the provision would “accelerate the pressure to make
production without reasonable and adequate review.”249 Many commentators
would require reviewing attorneys to make reasonable efforts to review
material or else risk waiver of privilege in order to keep attorneys from
succumbing to economic pressure to lazily rely on a presumption that
privilege will not be waived.250 Judge Scheindlin noted in Zubulake that
parties may “forego privilege review altogether in favor of an agreement to
return inadvertently produced privileged documents.”251 Certainly, the sheer
volume of data commonplace in simple litigation and the uncertainty of
electronic data make detailed review impossible.252 The “quick peek” method

244. Id.
245. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 322-23 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
246. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 13, at 8-9.
247. Id. at 9.
248. Id. at 8-10. The Committee notes the problems associated with meta-data and ghost
data in privilege review. Id.
249. LCJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 178, at 10.
250. Id. at 9-10.
251. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
252. LCJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 178, at 11.
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would ease the burden upon producing parties and make production less costprohibitive.
B. Clarification of Federal Rule 26(b)(2)
Federal Rule 26(b)(2) limits discovery of electronic data if such
information is viewed as burdensome.253 Zubulake suggests that the broad
nature of all discovery has been consistently weighed against the costconsciousness of Federal Rule 26(b)(2).254 In the context of electronic
discovery, only certain classes of data, those that cause “undue burden or
expense” are candidates for cost-shifting.255 As a result, the Proposed
Amendment to this subsection limits the scope of electronic discovery in cases
where information is “not reasonably accessible”:
A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored
information that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible.
On motion by the requesting party, the responding party must show
that the information is not reasonably accessible. If that showing
is made, the court may order discovery of the information for good
cause and may specify terms and conditions for such discovery.256
The language of the Proposed Amendment suggests that if a producing
party believes that the information sought is not accessible through reasonable
efforts, the party will not have to produce that information if it can show the
inaccessible nature of the data and the court determines that no good cause for
production exists.257 The Committee Note to this proposal suggests a
definition for “reasonably accessible.”258 The Committee Note uses a
methodology much like Zubulake’s five classes of electronic data in defining
reasonably accessible data.259
Whether given information is “reasonably accessible” may depend
on a variety of circumstances. One referent would be whether the
party itself routinely accesses or uses the information. If the party
routinely uses the information — sometimes called “active
data” — the information would ordinarily be considered
reasonably accessible. The fact that the party does not routinely
253. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 318.
256. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 13, at 26 (proposed amendment to FED. R. CIV.
P. 26(b)(2)).
257. Id.
258. Id at 32-33.
259. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318-20.
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access the information does not necessarily mean that access
requires substantial effort or cost.260
This discussion of active data mirrors the discussion in Zubulake and
reinforces Zubulake’s mandate that only offline data merits a cost-shifting
analysis.261
The Committee Note provides examples of information that may not be
readily accessible. Information “deleted in a way that makes it inaccessible
without resort to expensive . . . forensic techniques” or data “retained in
obsolete systems” that is no longer used and is costly to retrieve would not
ordinarily be considered accessible.262 The Committee Note provides some
caution, however, suggesting that if the responding party has actually accessed
the information, the rule may not apply — even if the party incurred
significant expense in accessing the data.263
This change would seem to render the Zubulake test obsolete in all
situations except when the court orders discovery for good cause.264 Zubulake
and the proposed rule agree that when data is either “active” or accessible
without a substantial burden, no exceptions apply that would limit or preclude
discovery altogether.265 The Committee Note suggests that “the good-cause
analysis would balance the requesting party’s need for the information and the
burden on the responding party.”266 This analysis appears very similar to the
marginal utility test introduced in McPeek.267 The Committee Note also
suggests that sharing of expenses may be associated with these more
expensive forms of production.268 The McPeek, Zubulake, and Rowe cases are
cited with approval as case law that has “already begun to develop principles
for making such determinations.”269
Unfortunately, when the totality of the changes to Federal Rule 26(b)(2) are
considered, they do little to clarify the process of determining a method for
cost-shifting. The proposal itself codifies Zubulake’s suggestion that only

260. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 13, at 32.
261. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318-20.
262. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 13, at 31.
263. Id. at 32.
264. Id. at 33-34 (proposed amendment to FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)).
265. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318-20.
266. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 13, at 34.
267. McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001). The McPeek test also suggested
that as the relevence of discoverable information decreases, the less just it becomes for a party
to bear its cost of production. Id.
268. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 13, at 34 (quoting MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004)).
269. Id.
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inaccessible electronic data should be subject to restrictions.270 If the data
sought is successfully classified as inaccessible, the court will apply a
balancing test to determine the need to discover it nonetheless. The
Committee Note neither suggests a bright-line rule nor declares which of the
three tests cited may be most appropriate, instead mentioning that “[c]ourts
will adapt the principles of Rule 26(b)(2) to the specific circumstances of each
case.”271 The Committee Note specified its interest in whether the change
gives “sufficient guidance to litigants, lawyers and judges” on the limits of
electronic discovery, “including allocating the costs of such discovery.”272
Concerning the test to be used, however, it is difficult to ascertain what
guidance, if any, the Proposed Amendment gives.
C. How Federal Rule 34 Defines “Documents”
The Advisory Committee noted that although the 1970 Amendment to
Federal Rule 34 authorized discovery of “data compilations,” electronically
stored data that is both important and discoverable may often not be
contemplated by the Rule.273 Thus, the Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule
34 would require document requests to be framed in such a way to specify
whether documents or electronically stored information, or both, is sought.274
The Proposed Amendment allows a requesting party to request to “inspect,
copy, test or sample” electronically stored information or specified
documents.275 The new version also expands the type of forms in which this
electronic information may be found to include images and sound recordings,
and also allows for discovery of compilations “in any medium.”276 The
Committee Note insists that “Rule [34](a)(1) is intended to be broad enough
to cover all current types of computer-based information, and flexible enough
to encompass future changes and developments.”277 Therefore, while older
versions of the Federal Rules have specified that electronic tapes and
phonorecords contained discoverable information, the Amendment
contemplates the inclusion of future technology.278 While most courts
interpret the range of electronic data to be covered by the present version of
Rule 34, the Committee Note seeks to avoid the scenario where a responding
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 320.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 13, at 34.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 49-50.
Id. at 44 (proposed amendment to FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1)).
Id. at 45.
Id. at 49.
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1).
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party avoids reviewing and producing electronic data simply because a
production request does not specify electronic data.279 The Amendment clears
up uncertainty regarding sampling and testing of electronic data.280 Thus,
searches can be defined to find other discoverable information. Again, this
change seems to benefit responding parties by providing them actual notice of
the scope of document requests.
The proposed change to Rule 34 also mentions that the form in which the
requested data is produced may be specified in requests.281 If no specific form
is given, a responding party is to produce the information in its “ordinarily
maintained” form, or in a form that is searchable electronically.282 This
method is functionally analogous to the option to request labeled and
organized hard-copy materials because it enhances the ability of the party
seeking production to locate relevant information.283 Objections to production
of electronic documents may include objections to the form of production, and
will again be governed by Federal Rule 26(b)(2).284
D. Effectiveness of the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
The proposed changes to the Federal Rules effectively address the unique
problems associated with electronic data. Specifically, the “quick peek”
approach to limiting waiver allows courts to follow the mechanisms outlined
in Zubulake without parties having to undertake lengthy and expensive
privilege reviews of an entire computer system before the “test run” to
determine relevance.285 The changes to Federal Rule 26(b)(2) codify the case
law of Zubulake regarding the kinds of electronic data that may be considered
burdensome to produce.286 The changes to Federal Rule 34 eliminate
confusion between parties regarding what is required in response to a request
for production. However, the comments accompanying the proposed
Amendments do nothing to address the precise method that should be used to
shift costs if a court determines that production is necessary despite
inaccessibility.287 Thus, the proposed changes do nothing to stipulate a
standard for federal courts in shifting costs in cases like Wiginton.

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 13, at 16.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 46 (proposed amendment to FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)).
Id. at 47 (proposed amendment to FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(ii)).
Id. at 50.
Id. at 16.
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Id.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 13, at 34.
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VI. What Should We Do? Recommendations in Light of Electronic
Discovery
A. Recommendations to Requesting Parties
A party requesting documents that require expensive production techniques
will want to avoid incurring cost through cost-shifting analysis. Fortunately,
the requesting party has the benefit of the presumption that a producing party
bears the costs of its own production.288
In light of the three-step Zubulake analysis, the easiest way to avoid costs
being shifted to the requesting party is to request documents that are known
to be online.289 If the requested documents are on the producing party’s hard
drives, storage media such as CD-ROM or floppy media, or some modern
archival disks, the data is considered online.290 Fortunately for requesting
parties, as the cost of data storage continues to decrease and the physical space
required for storage also decreases, most types of archives will be considered
online.291
If the documents needed are not available in the online storage of a
producing party, a requesting party may still avoid having the costs shifted.
It is of great importance that the requesting party ensure its requests are not
considered as an undue burden.292 The two most important Zubulake factors
that will be examined for minimizing cost-shifting when requesting offline
documents are the tailoring of the requests to discover relevant documents and
the availability of the documents from another source.293
The Zubulake analysis requires some factual basis for the administration of
the cost-shifting factors.294 In Zubulake, the “test-run” using the requesting
party’s search criteria produced sixty-seven “highly relevant” documents from
a search group of 600.295 The court then specifically discussed six e-mails that
were “striking,” and specifically addressed some of the issues presented in the
288. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978).
289. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318. “In fact, whether production of documents is unduly
burdensome or expensive turns primarily on whether it is kept in an accessible or inaccessible
format.” Id.
290. Id. at 319-20.
291. The cost of storage on computer hard drives has decreased from one dollar per kilobyte
in 1994 to six cents per kilobyte in mid-1998 to one cent the end of 2000. The cost in 2004 was
near one-tenth of a cent. Historical Notes About the Costs of Hard Drive Storage Space (Apr.
2004), http://www.alts.net/ns1625/winchest.html.
292. The tests of Zubulake and Rowe are crafted to ensure that FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) is
upheld.
293. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 323.
294. Id.
295. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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case.296 The produced e-mails also contained new information, which could
not have been found without the search.297 The success of the test-run
regarding the utility of the information was determined to favor keeping the
burden on the producing party, even though none of the documents produced
would prove the requesting party’s case.298 The marginal utility was
potentially high, and as the producing party is required to prove that costshifting is warranted, this potential was effective.299 These factors weighed
against cost-shifting.300
The success of a requesting party with the marginal utility in Zubulake
should be contrasted with Wiginton. In Wiginton, the court determined that
between 1.5% and 6% of the documents were responsive.301 The court
expressed the opinion that far less than 4% of the documents were actually
relevant.302 Despite the fact that the documents were only available from the
producing party, the large percentage of unresponsive documents in the “testrun” favored cost-shifting.303
Documents were not available from another source in either Zubulake or
Wiginton, but the language of both cases makes clear that evidence that the
electronic documents are otherwise available would cut very strongly in favor
of cost-shifting.304 Thus, even with the knowledge that an opposing party has
offline documents that would normally be subject to discovery, these
documents should not be requested if there is a less burdensome manner of
retrieving them.
A party requesting discovery should also compare the cost of discovery to
the value of the litigation. While it may be tempting to make a discovery
request that is so expensive that settlement becomes more attractive for the
producing party, it is this very situation that the cost-shifting factors seek to
avoid.305 In Zubulake, the very high document recovery cost of over $150,000
was not considered “significantly disproportionate” from the potentially

296. Id. at 285-86.
297. Id. at 286-87.
298. Id. at 287.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 573-74 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
302. Id. at 575.
303. Id.
304. This is clear from the second Zubulake factor. Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 287; see also
Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 575.
305. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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multimillion dollar value of the lawsuit.306 Thus, even this very high cost
weighed against cost-shifting.307
In Wiginton, the potential recovery of the requesting party was in some
question.308 The requesting party estimated that the cost of discovery would
reach near $250,000.309 This value favored cost-shifting, as the potential
recovery was not significantly higher than this discovery cost. Further, if the
requesting party required that the search be expanded to all of the producing
party’s offices, the cost of discovery could extend into the millions of
dollars.310
The only possible excuse for making a discovery request when the cost of
discovery is very high compared to the amount in controversy is when the
other cost factors strongly favor the requesting party. For instance, if the
requesting party has very limited resources and the producing party has nearly
unlimited resources, policy could require that the cost remain on the
responding party to avoid a chilling effect on lawsuits in such situations.311
In making requests for electronic documents, a requesting party should
tailor its requests to avoid the appearance that the party is simply “fishing for
information” or making a burdensome request to produce a settlement. Either
a lack of specificity or an undue burden will likely result in a large portion of
the cost of discovery being shifted to the requesting party. Further, if a court
ordered “test-run” is clearly unresponsive, as was the case in Wiginton, it may
be better to withdraw the request for documents instead of bearing as much as
75% of the cost of discovery.312
B. Recommendations to Producing Parties
Producing parties have a much more difficult task, as they face both the
presumption that the producing party pays for discovery and the possibility of
sanctions if they intentionally obstruct the production of documents.
The first step for any producing party facing extensive electronic document
requests is to determine if the documents are offline. While searching
organized, optical storage devices or storage disks such as CD-ROM or DVD306. Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 288.
307. Id.
308. Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 575. There were five named plaintiffs, and they contended that
if a class of plaintiffs were certified, the recovery would extend into the tens of millions of
dollars. Id. The court was unwilling to speculate about the certification of the class action. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318.
312. Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 577. In this case, a highly unresponsive test-run led to a large
amount of the discovery costs being shifted to the requesting party, despite other factors that
weighed against cost-shifting.
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ROM drives may be time consuming, these media are designed for storage of
documents, and under Zubulake are categorized as “online” or “near-line”
data.313 Unless the data exists in either backup tape format or is represented
by deleted file fragments, the cost-shifting analysis is irrelevant.314
While the analysis of cost-shifting may provide the impression that
corporations should store old documents in inaccessible archives to avoid
having to pay for retrieval, a much simpler solution is to store all documents
on an easily searchable server, and delete old documents consistently and
permanently. With the decreasing cost of storage space, it is not expensive to
store information in easily retrievable databases that require very little search
time.315 Storing all data online allows for quick reference for business
purposes and low cost in case production is compelled. Because deleted
“ghost” data is discoverable, responding to document requests by answering
that the information is “deleted” is not sufficient.316 Instead, a company may
choose to employ new e-mail and document archival software, which will
categorize and sort files based on search terms, while discarding and
completely wiping outdated, irrelevant documents.317
Great care should be taken when deleting documents. If litigation is
contemplated regarding the documents in question, document destruction
programs must be stopped with respect to that document, even if a complaint
has not been filed.318 The Zubulake court did not mandate that all document
destruction programs should end when litigation is contemplated, but rather
only those programs which could destroy a relevant document.319 The only
exception is that a company may continue to delete inaccessible backup tapes
that are kept only for the purpose of emergency system restoration, in
accordance with a consistent destruction program.320
The consequences of failing to preserve electronic documents properly,
especially when the documents are intentionally deleted, are harsh.321 In
313. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318-19.
314. Id. at 319. The difference between an “optical archive” and a “backup tape” is one of
organization. Id. While archival systems are designed to be searched, backup tapes are
organized like a computer hard drive with no menu — the data is simply an image on the surface
of the tape, and no directory for searching exists. Id.
315. Id. at 318.
316. Waxse, supra note 7, ¶ 23.
317. A number of services now exist, including DataArchiver from CommVault, Email
Xaminer from Legato, and others.
318. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
319. Id.
320. Id. at 218.
321. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). “In
sum, counsel has a duty to effectively communicate to her client its discovery obligations so that
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Zubulake, the producing party destroyed documents after orders to preserve
were issued. In fact, the responding party “deleted the e-mails in defiance of
explicit instructions not to.”322 Accordingly, the jury was given an adverse
inference instruction regarding the deleted e-mails.323 The offending party
was required to pay all costs associated with the requesting party having to redepose witnesses because of slow production of documents.324
To avoid such sanctions, Judge Scheindlin placed the responsibility on the
parties to run keyword searches for relevant documents and then ensure that
those documents were not deleted until the litigation at hand was resolved.325
Further, any relevant backup media must be protected.326 In sum, a responding
party must vigorously guard any relevant documents or databases.
VII. Conclusion
As the cost of data storage in online format continues to decrease and data
retention programs become more common and strictly followed, the need for
a hard-and-fast rule for cost-shifting in electronic discovery disputes will
diminish. The cost of hard drive space is 900 times lower now than it was ten
years ago.327 If this trend continues, the need for archiving data may cease to
exist entirely.328
Archiving using backup tapes continues today and the recovery of deleted
documents will continue to be relevant. Because no federal standard
regarding cost-shifting in these expensive discovery procedures is emerging,
courts will likely continue to use Zubulake’s evolving test to determine the
need for cost-shifting.329 The goal of this test appears to be making electronic
all relevant information is discovered, retained, and produced. In particular, once the duty to
preserve attaches, counsel must identify sources of discoverable information.” Id. at 439.
322. Id. at 436.
323. Id. at 437.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 432.
326. Id.
327. In January 1995, the cost of a megabyte of hard drive space was approximately one
dollar. In mid-2004, nine megabytes of space cost one cent. Historical Notes about the Cost
of Hard Drive Space, supra note 291.
328. Another 500-fold drop in the cost of disk space and nearly two gigabytes (1 billion
bytes) would cost one cent. The total amount of printed material in the world is approximately
equal to 200 petabytes, or 200 million gigabytes. Therefore, by 2015, even if the depreciation
of hard drive cost slows by half, it will only cost $2 million to store the information of every
paper document in human history. Id.
329. Zubulake has become the standard, cited with approval in cases, including Wiginton,
in four separate jurisdictions during the fourteen months following the decision. See Quinby
v. WestLB AG, No. 04CIV.7406(WHP)(HBP), 2005 WL 3453908 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2005);
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discovery analogous to traditional discovery, which presumes that costs rest
on the responding party while protecting that party from unduly burdensome
requests.330 Both requesting and responding parties must consider costshifting when faced with discovery that involves inaccessible data.
Electronic documents are difficult to destroy, and often less formal than
their paper counterparts. As a result, these documents will often contain
unique evidence essential to litigation. Carefully framed document requests
are essential when an individual seeks inaccessible data from a corporate
party. Likewise, those with large archives of stored data should properly
preserve documents and make efforts to completely destroy irrelevant material
when it is proper to do so. Often, a court’s decision regarding the allocation
of costs in this very expensive discovery will induce settlement, and thus
determine the outcome of the litigation itself.
Ross Chaffin
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